The standard narrative of the meltdown of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers assumes that the wealth of the top executives of these firms was largely wiped out along with their firms. In the ongoing debate about regulatory responses to the financial crisis, commentators have used this assumed fact as a basis for dismissing both the role of compensation structures in inducing risk-taking and the potential value of reforming such structures. This paper provides a case study of compensation at Bear Stearns and Lehman during 2000-2008 and concludes that this assumed fact is incorrect.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of [2008] [2009] , there are widespread beliefs that executive pay arrangements could have encouraged excessive risk-taking and that fixing those arrangements will be important in preventing similar excesses in the future.
These beliefs have led firms and public officials to seek compensation reforms that would eliminate excessive incentives to take risks. result, the bottom-line payoffs of these executives during 2000-2008 were not negative but decidedly positive. Our analysis has implications for the continuing debates on whether financial executives had incentives to take excessive risks and whether pay arrangements need to be restructured.
Section II introduces the teams of top executives on which our analysis focuses.
During [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] , the composition of the top-five-executives team remained largely stable at both Bear Stearns and Lehman. The shareholder payoffs these teams produced were indisputably poor; shareholders who held their shares throughout the period lost most of their initial investment.
Section III discusses the large paper losses on shares held that the top teams suffered when their firms melted down -the losses on which the standard narrative focuses. We observe, however, that these losses do not tell the full picture of the 12 We could have avoided these problems by looking at all the "named executive officers" in any given year, but incentives operate at the level of individuals, so looking at a group with changing membership might produce misleading conclusions. We therefore chose to look at the incentives of five individuals who served as top executives during all or most of the relevant period.
As Figure 1 shows, the two top executive teams initially produced stellar returns, There can be little doubt that the banks' executives had strong reasons to prefer that their companies survive. Furthermore, the executives' holding so many shares at the time of the collapse indicates that they had not foreseen in 2007 or early 2008 that such a collapse was around the corner. The important question, however, is whether the executives had an incentive to make decisions that created an excessive risk -though by no means certainty -of massive losses at some (uncertain) time down the road.
In particular, excessive incentives to take risks might have been generated by executives' ability to cash out compensation based on the firms' short-term results. To the extent that executives did cash out large amounts of such compensation, their decisions might have been distorted by an excessive focus on short-term results. This problem, first highlighted several years ago in a book and accompanying articles coauthored by one of us, 22 has received much attention in the wake of the crisis from both public officials and business leaders. Risk, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2009, at 7 ("An individual's performance should be evaluated over time so as to avoid excessive risk-taking. To ensure this, all equity awards need to be subject to future delivery and/or deferred exercise. Senior executive officers should be required to retain most of Properly examining this issue requires examining not only the losses Bear Stearns' and Lehman's top executives suffered as their firms collapsed, but also the compensation they derived in preceding years. Many of the decisions that ultimately led to the failure of the companies, such as the decisions to get heavily involved in the securitized assets markets, were made a substantial period of time before the final collapse. To assess the executives' incentives when they made decisions that determined the future risks facing their banks, one needs to look at their compensation over a longer period of time. 26 Because these salaries were independent of performance, we do not take them into account in our further analysis.
On top of their cash salaries, however, these top executives received sizeable amounts of performance-based cash bonuses in the years 2000-2008, as shown in Table   1 . The Bear Stearns and Lehman CEOs alone took home about $87 million and $70 million respectively (in 2009 dollars). As explained in section II above, the numbers for executives 2 through 5 are biased downwards because some of them were not "named executive officers" for each year 2000-2008; hence their bonuses were not disclosed in the firms' proxy statements in every single year during this period. 26 We obtain these and the following numbers directly from the banks' annual proxy statements and, in the case of Bear Stearns for 2007, its amended form 10-K/A, supra note 11. These numbers are identical to those reported in the ExecuComp database, with two exceptions. First, ExecuComp reports higher compensation for Bear Stearns executives in 2000 because it adds payments relating to a transition period in 1999 when Bear was changing fiscal years to payments reported for 2000. Second, ExecuComp does not report any bonus payments for Lehman executives in 2007, presumably because Lehman extraordinarily reported these "cash bonuses" as "Non-Equity Incentive Plan Compensation" in the "Summary Compensation Source: Annual proxy statements and, for Bear Stearns in 2007, the amended 10-K. All amounts are inflation-adjusted to January 2009 dollars using the CPI, and relate to fiscal years, not calendar years.
• In our analysis of the executives' benefits from equity-based compensation, we focus on the actual sales of shares of stock rather than the grant of such shares or options We use for our analysis the Thomson Financial's Insiders database, which builds on SEC filings on forms 3, 4, and 5. Table 2 shows for each executive and year the amount received from trading in the companies' shares. The amounts shown are net amounts: We substract from the dollar amounts received any amounts invested in shares during that year -either in the exercise of stock options or the purchase of shares in the market. As we do throughout, we inflation-adjust all dollar amounts to 2009 dollars. As Table 2 A noteworthy feature of the pattern displayed in Table 2 It is also interesting to note that most executives were able to sell more shares during the period 2000-2007 than they held at the end in 2008. The value of the remaining shares is thus relatively modest (for Bear Stearns' executives) or non-existent (for Lehman's executives). As Table 4 
2008
. 41 This distinction is not clear-cut, however, and so we count all securities, whether vested or unvested, so that our estimates of initial investments will be biased upwards (and that our subsequent estimates of the executives' net gains during 2000-2008 will be biased downwards). We value all stock and phantom stock using the stock price as of 12/31/1999.
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As Table 5 In the case of Lehman, assembling the initial holdings information is complicated by the fact that three of the "named executive officers" of 2007 on whom we focus in this paper
were not yet part of that group in 2000, and hence their holdings were not yet disclosed in the proxy statement. 44 For these three individuals, we value their holdings instead at the point when they were first disclosed in Lehman's proxy. 45 This procedure is likely to produce an overestimate of the value of their holdings in 2000 (and thus result in our underestimating the executives' net gains during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] : this is because (i) the number of shares the executives had in 2000 was likely lower than the number of shares they had when they first appeared in the proxy statements as named executives, and (ii) the stock price of their company rose steeply during this period. In this sense, the numbers we give below are conservative in that they likely work against the possibility of finding significant net positive payoffs in the period 2000-2008. Table 5 summarizes our estimates of the value of executives' initial holdings. 44 These three executives are Goldfarb, O'Meara, and Russo. 45 For Goldfarb, O'Meara, and Russo, the relevant proxy statements are those of 2004, 2007, and 2003, respectively . We value the stock at the stock price on the day for which the numbers are given in the proxy statement, i.e., January 31 of the year in which the proxy statement was distributed. A comparison of Tables 4 and Table 5 shows the significance of the large amounts that the executives cashed from bonuses and equity sales during 2000-2008. Despite the large losses the banks' executives suffered on their holdings when their banks 
VII. IMPLICATIONS
We now turn to the implications of our findings. We have seen that, during 2000-2008, the top executive teams received large amounts of performance-based compensation, which were large enough to provide them with net positive payoffs for the period after accounting for the losses they suffered on their holdings at the beginning of this period. This conclusion might lead some to wonder whether the teams received excessive amounts of performance-based compensation. Given that overall performance during the period under consideration was indisputably disastrous for the company's shareholders, some might view the executives' performance-based compensation levels as excessive. In response, others might argue that, even though this compensation was labeled performance-based, significant parts of it were in fact salaries. In Wall Street firms, so the argument goes, significant portions of an executive's performance-based compensation are, in fact, salary and are expected to be paid even if performance is abysmal.
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In this paper, however, we would like to put aside the question of pay levels and whether they were appropriate or excessive. Our focus is instead on the issue of 46 The exception is Lehman's O'Meara, for whom we calculate a net loss of $20m. O'Meara, however, only joined Lehman's NEO team in 2007, so that earnings and trades are disclosed for few years and the initial holdings are valued at almost the peak stock price of early 2007. It is likely that a positive net benefit would obtain in a full review of O'Meara's undisclosed compensation and initial holdings as of 2000. 47 What incentives do firms have to label salary as performance-based compensation? They might try to camouflage the nature of compensation to hide it either from Uncle Sam (for top executives, compensation in excess of $1 million is deductible only if it is performance-based) or from shareholders (who might be more resistant to high pay levels when they are not performance-based).
incentives. In particular, our chief interest is in whether the companies' pay arrangements provided their executives with excessive incentives to take risks. performance-based compensation did not produce a tight alignment of executives'
interests with long-term shareholder value. Rather, the design provided executives with substantial opportunities (of which they made considerable use) to take large amounts of compensation based on short-term gains off the table and retain it even after the drastic reversal of the two companies' fortunes. Such a design provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in short-term results even at the cost of maintaining an excessively elevated risk of an implosion at some point down the road.
Consider the structure of the firms' bonus compensation. The executives were able to obtain large amounts of bonus compensation based on high earnings in the years preceding the financial crisis, but did not have to return any of those bonuses when the earnings subsequently evaporated and turned into massive losses. Such a design of bonus compensation provides executives with incentives to seek improvements in short-term earnings figures even at the cost of maintaining an excessively high risk of large losses down the road.
Similarly, the cashing out of large amounts of shares and options by executives throughout the period provided those executives with incentives to place significant weight on the effect of their decisions on short-term stock prices. Such a design again
gives executives an incentive to seek improved short-term results, which can lift short-term prices or prevent short-term price declines, even when doing so has the potential for adverse effects on long-term value.
We would like to emphasize that the question is not whether the firms' top executives fully anticipated such a collapse. Surely, the fact that the executives did not sell in 2007 all the shares they were free to sell indicates that they did not anticipate that a collapse of their firms was around the corner. The question is whether the executivesand executives in similar circumstances in other firms -had incentives to run the firms in a way that involved an excessive probability -though by no means a certainty -of massive losses at some uncertain date down the road. Our analysis indicates that the pay arrangements at the firms -and similar pay arrangements elsewhere -did provide some such incentives.
That the firms' executives had incentives to take excessive risks, it should be stressed, does not imply that their decisions were in fact affected by such incentives. To begin, many individuals may be influenced by non-monetary motivations. Moreover, to the extent that the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman were "excessively optimistic" and did not, say, perceive any risks to their firms, their behavior would have been the same whether or not they had incentives to take excessive risks. Our analysis indicates that the executives' payoffs provided them with excessive risk-taking incentives, but it does not establish that these incentives in fact had an impact on the executives' decisions. Yet even though our analysis does not show these incentives in fact had an effect, it does show that concerns that this might have happened should not be dismissed, but rather taken seriously.
In any event, whether the risk-taking that took place in the past resulted from executives' misperceptions or executives' incentives need not be resolved for the important purposes of deciding what should be done going forward. Even if misperceptions and excessive optimism drove risk-taking during this decade, there is a good reason to get rid of incentives for excessive risk-taking going forward, lest they produce excessive risk-taking in the future.
One of the powerful lessons of economics is that incentives matter. When agents have interests that diverge from those of their principals, economists worry that the agents' incentives may lead them to act in a way that does not best serve the principals.
The logic of incentives has led institutional investors and others to support pay packages that are quite large in order to enable the provision of strong incentives. Such packages come to address the widely accepted concern that, absent equity-based and bonus compensation, executives' interests will not be sufficiently aligned with shareholder interests. This logic, however, makes it essential as well to ensure that the design of performance-based compensation does not create perverse incentives.
Thus, firms and regulators would do well to devote considerable attention to examining how the design of performance based compensation can better link the payoffs of executives with long-term results. As to bonus plans, the adoption of clawback provisions and bonus bank provisions should be considered. Such arrangements would prevent executives from pocketing in their entirety bonuses based on results in a given year when the results do not hold afterwards.
As to equity-based compensation, consideration should be given to refining its design to induce executives to place lower weight on short-term stock prices and greater weight on long-term stock prices. As we have seen, the top executives of Bear Stearns and Lehman were able to sell more shares during 2000-2008 than they were left with at the time of the firms' collapse. The executives' regular cashing out of equity incentives provided them with incentives to attach weight to short-term results.
Whereas Lehman's executives were in many cases free to unload options shortly after their vesting, companies would do well to place meaningful constraints on such unloading. As to shares, Bear Stearns and Lehman did have substantial limitations on unloading, which was permitted only five years after vesting. With such limitations, executives who are in their first or second year of their service would not attach any weight to short-term prices. However, when a firm's top executives serve for many years, as was largely the case with Bear Stearns and Lehman's executives, such arrangements will not prevent executives who have served the company for a long time (and who consequently have some awarded shares they are free to unload) from placing a significant weight on short-tem prices.
One way to ensure that executives place more weight on long-term stock prices is to require them to retain a substantial fraction of the shares and options awarded to them until retirement. This approach has been long followed by Goldman Sachs, which requires executives to hold 75% of awarded shares until they retire. As one of us stressed in recent work with Jesse Fried, however, hold-till-retirement requirements provide executives with a counterproductive incentive to depart, and this incentive would be especially strong in the case of executives who have been successful and have amassed a large equity portfolio. An alternative approach put forward in this work is to allow executives in any given year to cash out only a rather limited fraction, say 10%, of the portfolio of shares and options that they hold. A comprehensive discussion of the optimal design of limits on the unloading of options and shares is, of course, beyond the scope of this paper. 48 But the analysis of this paper indicates that the importance of such reforms
should not be dismissed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The stories of Lehman and Bear Stearns will undoubtedly remain in the annals of 
